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THE NEW YORK PLAN: A FREE
CHOICE MODIFICATION
GUIDO CALABRESI*
The New York plan is, in my opinion, the best first party system
that has yet been proposed. It has, to be sure, some weaknesses. For in-
stance, a complete system of automobile accident law must provide for the
imposition of noninsurable tort fines, preferably income-related, to supplement
the enterprise or market deterrence that can be achieved through an intelligent
allocation of accident costs.' The New York plan does not provide for such a
system of tort fines.2 It is not my purpose, however, to devote this article to a
consideration of possible omissions of this kind. Nor do I propose to discuss
those characteristics of the plan that I think are especially desirable, for
example, that it, unlike the Keeton-O'Connell plan, is not subject to early
obsolescence because of inflation.8 Rather, I intend to discuss the two principal
criticisms that have been made of the New York plan, and to suggest a free
choice modification which, if worked out in detail, might meet these objections.
It is assumed, of course, that the objections that have been made to the plan
are motivated by good faith and not by an interest in retaining the status quo.
The first asserted objection to the New York proposal is that the public
does not want a nonfault insurance plan that does not provide for compulsory
compensation for pain and suffering; in short, despite all its deficiencies,
people prefer the present tort liability system. The second asserted objection
is that the administrative cost savings envisaged under the New York plan
are, as a practical matter, illusory; they would be more than overcome by in-
creases in the number of serious accidents which opponents of the plan assert
would follow its adoption. This latter objection implies that the advocates of
a nonfault plan are selling a pig in a poke which, once bought, cannot be
returned.
Both of these objections would be overcome if it were possible for
individuals to choose either to remain under the existing tort liability system
or to opt for the nonfault coverage proposed by the New York plan. In either
* John Thomas Smith Professor of Law, Yale University. B.S., Yale, 1953, LL.B.,
1958; M.A., Oxford, 1959; M.A., Yale, 1962. After this article was written, I had occasion
to read Professors Keeton and O'Connell's contribution to this symposium. The similarities
between our approaches are striking. It is encouraging that we independently reached such
closely related conclusions.
1. For a general discussion of the relationship between market deterrence and fines,
as well as how each of these is related to other goals of accident law, see G. CALABRasI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOmIC ANALYSIS (1970).
2. The explanation for this omission may well be that the plan was formulated by
the New York Insurance Department and income-related tort fines are far afield from
insurance regulation.
3. I am referring, of course, to the fact that the New York plan covers full
economic loss; the coverage is not limited to a dollar maximum which all too soon
becomes totally different, in real terms, from that intended.
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case, the individual would bear the costs of the plan he chose. I believe that
a system can be created that would allow this freedom of choice. Such a
system would entail some administrative costs, and, in the system sketched
out below, these costs would be disproportionately borne by those who chose
the new first party plan. But, this additional burden may be appropriate, at
least until such time as the reform has demonstrated its merit.4
The proposed free choice system would require all car owners to choose
to be insured under either a first party system or a slightly modified version
of the tort liability system. An automobile owner who opted for the tort
liability system would retain his rights to recover under existing rules of law
and would be liable under those same rules for injuries caused by him. This
right to recovery and these liabilities would continue to be governed by the
familiar tort -rules of negligence and contributory negligence; the collateral
benefits rule would apply; and damages for pain and suffering would continue
to be awarded or assessed. The one suggested change would be to raise the
level of compulsory third party insurance to as near to total conceivable
coverage as possible; individuals would be allowed, however, to opt out or to
obtain a deductible provision upon a showing of financial responsibility,
The rights and liabilities of a car owner who chose a first party plan
would be essentially those described in the New York plan. He would recover
his full economic loss from his first party insurer, but he would not recover
for pain and suffering or for certain kinds of property damage unless he
elected to purchase coverage beyond the minimum required., He would also
not, however, be liable to third parties with the possible exception of passen-
gers and pedestrians.
A problem would arise upon the occurrence of an accident that involved
some parties who had chosen the present system and some who had chosen
4. I am not suggesting that either of the objections made to the New York plan are
valid. In fact, I would guess them both to be nonsense. Nevertheless it may be appropriate
to test out such a guess and to put the burden of proof on those who, like myself, believe
in change.
5. In this country at least, unlimited third party automobile liability insurance
apparently is not easily available. Short of such unlimited coverage, compulsory insurance
(or proof of financial responsibility) ought to be high enough so that virtually all accident
costs would in fact be borne by those who are held liable. Anything less would understate
the true costs of the tort liability system. To the extent that a driver could avoid paying
for losses he caused by being underinsured and judgment-proof, his choice for the tort
liability system would be subsidized by those who were unlucky enough to be seriously
injured by him. That result cannot be a valid basis for choosing existing law.
6. I think a first party plan should provide not only optional, scheduled insurance for
dignitary losses (so much for an arm, so much for a leg), but also optional, scheduled
insurance for pure pain and suffering. But to schedule pain and suffering as such is
probably impossible. An adequate way of dealing with the matter is to allow people who
opt for first party insurance to insure against pain and suffering, which would be defined
as a set percentage of, say, medical bills. An insurance company could offer various
options at various prices, e.g., 50%, 100% or 200%, of medical bills as additional pain andsuffering coverage. In effect, this option would allow people to value their own propensity
for pain and suffering, analogously to what they do today when they buy life insurance.
Cf. AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, REOaRT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND
EVAUTE THE .EETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
REPARATIONS (1968).
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the New York plan. Before dealing with that problem, however, it may be well
to describe what would happen in the unlikely event that all accidents involved
only those who had chosen the same accident law system. Under this heroic
assumption, the insurance costs under each plan would reflect a combination
of the administrative and accident costs of that plan. If, as the proponents of
first party plans claim, administrative costs are much reduced and accident
costs are either left unchanged or reduced by a first party plan, then premiums
under the first party plan would be much less than those under the tort
liability system. If, instead, the proponents of the tbrt liability system are cor-
rect in their contention that the administrative savings of first party plans
would be either illusory or devoured by an increase in accident costs, then
premiums under the first party plan would be higher than those under the tort
liability system. In either event, individuals would be free to choose which
protection they prefer; indeed, some might rationally choose the higher priced
plan because they prefer the protection it affords.
This freedom of choice is not available under the present system; nor
would it be under the New York plan as currently proposed. At present, a
car owner can purchase full economic coverage from a first party insurer;
under current law, however, he must also pay for third party insurance and
receive, for a price, what he may not desire: the right to sue at common law
for damages including pain and suffering and the right to double recovery
entailed by the collateral benefits rule. Similarly, under the New York proposal,
the car owner who did not want full economic coverage, but who instead
wanted to gamble on being doubly compensated for losses from collateral
sources and under the fault principle could not buy the coverage he desired.
The plan here suggested would test in practical operation what coverage people
in fact desire. This test would be conducted in the light of the actual costs of
the two proposed systems of coverage--costs measured in terms of the number
and severity of accidents and the extent of administrative expenses.
Not all accidents, of course, would involve people who have chosen the
same plan; many accidents would be "mixed." Although provisions for deal-
ing with "mixed" accidents complicate this free choice plan, they do not
present insurmountable obstacles. Let us assume that D. R. I. Atla (who
chose the tort liability system) was injured in an accident negligently caused
by Stewart O'Keeton (who opted for the first party system). Since O'Keeton
would not be liable, how would Atla recover? The free choice scheme
would require the equivalent of an uninsured motorist pool that would serve
as the subrogated defendant against which Atla would have recourse under
tort law. Where would the pool obtain the money to pay for such suits?
Presumably there would also be accidents in which D. R. I. Atla negligently
injured Stewart O'Keeton. In such cases, the pool, as the subrogated plaintiff,
would recover from Atla all damages available under existing tort law.
This leaves two questions unanswered. First, who would pay the adminis-
HeinOnline -- 71 Colum. L. Rev.  269 1971
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW[l
trative costs of the fund? And second, what would happen if the amount
collected by the fund as subrogated plaintiff were less (or more) than the
amount it had to pay as subrogated defendant? With regard to the first
question, the administrative costs would be charged to all third and first party
insurers in the state, in proportion to the amounts of insurance each had sold.
In effect, this procedure would allocate the administrative costs of a free choice
system among all persons insured under both systems. Although this proce-
dure appears on its face to be fair, it would actually favor those who elected
to remain under the tort liability system, because the administrative costs
incurred by the fund would arise from suits under tort law. Thus, those who
opted for the new approach would still be burdened with some of the costs of
the fault liability system. The same complaint could not be made by those who
opted for the existing tort liability system since they would simply be paying
their share of the administrative costs of the system they had chosen. But, I
am not unduly troubled by this extra burden on those who would choose the
new first party system; as innovators, they might be justifiably called upon to
bear some burdens, at least until the change was shown to be desirable.
A more complex problem may arise, however, since the revenues of the
fund need not equal its expenditures. If car owners who chose first party plans
had more accidents in which they were at fault than those who chose the fault
liability system, the fund would lose more in its role as a defendant than it
would win as plaintiff, thereby creating an excess of expenditures over receipts.
Conversely, if car owners who chose first party plans had fewer accidents in
which they were at fault than those who remained under the tort liability
system, the fund would receive more damage awards as plaintiffs than it
expended as defendants. These problems, which essentially go to the relative
general deterrence effect of two systems, might be heightened by a kind of self-
selection among people choosing between the two plans.
7
Again, however, these problems are not insurmountable. A deficit in the
fund would indicate that premiums for first party plan coverage were too low
in that they failed to reflect the excess costs of accidents, caused by those
insured under such coverage, to those who remained under the tort liability
system. Conversely, a surplus in the fund would indicate that first party
premiums were too high and failed to reflect the fact that first party car
owners were safer drivers or operated safer cars. Any resulting deficit, there-
fore, should be raised by charging all first party insurers an appropriate
share based on the amount of insurance each sells in the state; this assessment
would in turn cause insurers to increase first party premiums. If a surplus
resulted, the fund would make payments to the first party insurers, who in
turn would reduce first party premiums in the following year. In either event,
7. Cf. G. CALABRnEs, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
supra note 1, at 7-10.
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the full cost of mixed accidents would be properly allocated.8 This statement,
however, requires a caveat. Here too, those who opted for first party insurance
coverage would be at a disadavantage. For the determination of who ought to
bear the costs of mixed accidents would, in effect, be made by the legal norms
they had rejected. One could, of course, deal with mixed accidents in a way
that was less biased toward the status quo. As stated above, however, for the
purposes of this article, I remain willing to allocate all the doubtful burdens to
the innovators.
Before noting some remaining issues in regard to the free choice system,
it may be well to re-emphasize what could be achieved under a free choice
plan. People could decide whether they preferred existing tort liability in-
surance or first party insurance. A free choice plan would allow car owners
to choose with knowledge of the real administrative and accident costs of
each system; that is, car owners would be required to choose between in-
surance prices that would reflect both the accident cost avoidance effect of
each system and the administrative costs needed to buy that accident cost
avoidance. In short, the free choice plan would let consumer sovereignty
prevail.
Several issues remain, which I do not propose to treat fully in this article.
The first problem relates to the treatment of pedestrian and passenger victims.
My inclination is to deal with them under the following rules. (1) If the
pedestrian or passenger is a car owner, he will have opted either for the New
York plan or for the tort liability plan. That choice would determine his rights
and liabilities even when his injury occurred while he was a passenger or
pedestrian.9 (2) If the pedestrian or passenger is not a car owner but is a
member of a household in which there is one registered car owner, the rights
and liabilities of the pedestrian or passenger would be determined by the plan
chosen by the registered owner. (3) If there is more than one registered car
owner in the household, rights and liabilities would be provisionally determined
by the plan chosen by the "head of the household." The passenger or pedestrian
would however, be allowed to make a different choice prior to an accident by
filing notice with an appropriate state department that he chooses to adopt for
himself the type of coverage which another car owner in the household has
& The state insurance department would have to establish a procedure by which
these charges or refunds to first party sellers would be speedily reflected in the succeeding
year's premiums. If insurance companies are to sell first party insurance, they must be
allowed to pass on quickly any excess charges to the insured, Similarly, if motorists are
to be given a meaningful free choice, any surplus must also be quickly reflected in
lower charges. Like the manner in which the fund could be guaranteed until the system
is fully working, these details must be worked out, but they present no theoretical
difficulties.
9. That is, he would be dealt with precisely as the New York plan, as currently
presented, deals with injured pedestrians or passengers. If the car causing the injury,
however, is owned by someone who opted for tort liability insurance, the passenger or
pedestrian could either be given recovery from his own first party insurer or from the
pool. Each approach has advantages, and either is acceptable so long as only one is
allowed. In either case the pool would be a subrogated plaintiff.
19711
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elected.10 (4) if no one in the household is a car owner, either system could be
assumed to rule so long as the individuals involved were allowed to opt for the
opposite system by filing an appropriate notice." This outline obviously is not
meant to exhaust the problems of pedestrians and passengers, but simply to
suggest that they too can be dealt with effectively.
The second remaining issue in regard to a free choice system is that of
tort fines. Again, the question is too broad to deal with fully here. Nothing
in the proposed system, however, precludes the institution of uninsurable
tort fines, whether or not income related, only for those who opted for the
New York plan or only for those who chose the tort liability system or for
both. Whether tort fines would be added to either plan might depend upon
the effect each plan had on accident costs and therefore on premiums. For
example, if too many first party insureds caused accidents, those who opted
for such a plan might advocate the imposition of tort fines in order to reduce
their premiums. The same result might obtain for those who chose the tort
liability system if they determined that existing law resulted in excessive
accident costs and premiums.
The point of this example is general and goes well beyond the tort fine
issue. Allowing a choice between the New York plan and the existing system
does not imply that either is the best approach possible; indeed, that possible
improvements can be made in both is obvious. The two plans represent,
however, important alternative approaches, and, if free choice between the two
were allowed, further improvements in each system would not be excluded but,
rather, would be encouraged. As each plan competed with the other for cus-
tomers, a great incentive toward improving both would automatically arise.
This discussion raises a final question: is it worth having a double system,
and if it is, why not provide still more options? The simple answer to the first
part of this question is, let us see. The arguments in favor of some kind of
first party plan are strong. After all, a frequent defense made of the present tort
liability system is premised on the fact that many people buy first party cover-
age to supplement recoveries under the fault system, and, therefore, are not left
penniless in nonfault accident situations. On the other hand, those who defend
the status quo loudly claim that a change would destroy people's choices.
Should this argument not suffice to justify a double system? If after several
years few car owners opt for one of the plans and if the administrative costs
of the mixed system are high, the less popular system could be eliminated.
10. The members of the household would, be determined by the registrant when he
registers a car. That is, the registrant would be required when registering to name the
people who for insurance purposes would be considered part of his or her household.
Conflicting registrations could be handled by any appropriate rule of thumb.
11. Obviously, the pool would have to compensate a passenger or pedestrian who
was a member of a household in which no one owned a car and who opted for the New
York plan and was injured by a car whose owner had opted for tort liability. Again,
the pool would be a subrogated plaintiff against the injuring party.
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(An alternative, even then, would be to put all the administrative costs of a
mixed system on the small minority.) If, instead, a sizeable number of car
owners chose each of the systems, the argument that substantial free choice
would be destroyed by having only one approach would be compelling. In
effect, a double system would have given strong evidence of its value.
Once the free choice system demonstrates its value, the possibility of
granting further options could be considered. As previously noted, the New
York plan in its present form would offer two options to the car owners:
(1) to bear the burden of pain and suffering and to be free from liability to
others for the same; and (2) to buy scheduled, non-compulsory first party
insurance for pain and suffering, and still have no third party liability.'2 A
further option that might be added later would be (3) to retain the right to
recover for pain and suffering under the tort liability system, but to be liable
to third parties for pain and suffering. In other words, a car owner would be
allowed to opt for first party coverage with respect to economic damages and
to opt for tort recovery rights and tort liability coverage with respect to pain
and suffering.
As more options are allowed, of course, the system becomes more com-
plex and administrative costs correspondingly increase. The expense involved,
for example, in maintaining the pool required to deal with mixed accidents
would undoubtedly rise as the number of options increased. To add these
burdens to the system initially would be unnecessary and unwise. There is
strong support for each of the two basic approaches; it is enough for the
present to allow car owners adequate free choice between them. Further com-
plications of the free choice system should be postponed until there is general
demand for more options.
It should be obvious that these comments are not intended to indicate
precisely how a free choice system should be established. This proposal is
not meant to be a guide for drafting a statute, let alone- for a commentary on
a statute. Anyone drafting a statute embodying a free choice approach would
have to deal with a myriad of problems, ranging from the handling of com-
mercial vehicles to the problem of drunken drivers. These, like the precise
handling of pedestrians and passengers, are issues that deserve more detailed
thought than these comments can give. The purpose here, however, is to indi-
cate that the problems can be dealt with effectively and that, as a result of
dealing with them, the insurance buyer will be given a degree of choice in
deciding what compensation-system he wishes. This result is not only desirable
in itself, but will provide real information as to what car owners, in fact, want.
12. See note 6 stpra and accompanying text; see also STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ... FOR WnOSE BENEFIT? 95-97 (1970).
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